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ABSTRACT

For the past 20 years, there has been a growing aware
ness

and

Hospice.

acceptance

of

the

palliative

care

concepts

of

Hospice and the concept of palliative care repre

sent a dramatic shift from the traditional medical model of
physician-directed, institutional-centered health care.
What are the guiding principles of palliative care and
what are their ethical underpinnings?

The ethical principles

of autonomy, justice and care will be explored, as well as the
possibility for the abuse of palliative care under the current
climate of healthcare reform.
Recommendations will be made pertaining to reform of the
healthcare system, the education of healthcare professionals
and safeguards against using palliative care for the sole
purpose of cost-savings.

Finally, there will be discussion

about the benefits and burdens that might surface as a result
of viewing the provision of palliative care from a combined
perspective of justice and care.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Hospice, as defined by the National Hospice Organiza
tion provides palliative care to terminally ill patients,
their families, and significant others, 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, in both home and facility-based settings.
Physical, social, spiritual, and emotional care is provided
during the last stages of illness, during the dying process,
and during bereavement by a medically-directed interdisci
plinary team consisting of patients, families, profession
als, and volunteers.

Hospice philosophy recognizes dying as

part of the normal process of living and focuses on main
taining the quality of remaining life, neither hastening nor
postponing death.1
The growth of the hospice movement is one of the most
recent developments in the health care industry and has come
at a time when the focus has shifted from primarily institu
tion-based care to predominantly home-based care.2 At the
same time, with the acceleration of pressures on reduciing
health care costs and calls for reform, considerably more
attention has been focused on proposals to control costs at
the end of life.3 "Several studies have shown hospice care
in the last year of life to be less expensive than conven
1

2

tional care, with a greater cost advantage for home care
hospices than hospital-based hospices." 4 5 6 7 8

However,

the only study that randomized patients to conventional care
or hospice care found no significant differences in cost.9
Although it is not unanimous, the literature points to
positive trends in the ability of hospice to be a costeffective alternative for the terminally ill.
Our inability to finance the ever-increasing demand for
health care services is forcing us to evaluate the princi
ples of justice that have previously guided our society in
formulating its health care policies.

If the requirement of

distributive justice is that people should get what they
deserve, then the challenge for those working to reform
health care is to determine what it is that people are
entitled to.

Proponents of hospice are telling us that what

the terminally ill are entitled to is access to palliative
care.
Health care policies have generally been established
with three primary goals in mind:

increasing access,

reducing costs, and increasing quality.

These goals are

sometimes in conflict with each other and may require
tradeoffs that would initiate discussions of the ethical
problem:

who should get what health benefits?

It is within

this context that this thesis will examine the problems of
providing care for the terminally ill as seen from the

viewpoint of the ethics of justice as contrasted with the
ethic of care.
In the midst of these discussions about what care
should be available to whom and at what cost, the concept of
palliative care has been gradually developing within the
structure of the hospice movement. During the last twenty
years, the hospice movement has been not only the voice but
the heart of palliative care philosophy.

Similar to Carol

Gilligan's metaphor for women's way of reasoning, hospice
has been a "different voice" in health care.10
Advocates of palliative care are hesitant about placing
too much emphasis on the cost-saving benefits of hospice
care.

If the justification for palliative care is based

solely on its ability to conserve health care dollars the
fear is that the boundaries between palliative care and
futile care will become blurred.

While palliative care en

hances comfort and improves the quality of the patient's
life with no specific therapy being excluded from consider
ation, futile care places limits on what treatments will be
available based on that treatment's ability to cure, amelio
rate, improve or restore a quality of life that would be
satisfactory to the patient.11 Palliative care explores and
evaluates options in the context of the patient's values;
futile care frames the decisions within the physician's
medical expertise consistent with the available medical
literature.

Emily Friedman, a health policy analyst, fears
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that futility policies will be applied unevenly and doubts
whether implementation will be free of social bias, includ
ing age, gender, and income.12
Palliative care is not about achieving "efficient or
cost-effective dying."13 It is about the ethical responsi
bility of our society to care for the dying when the inevi
table limits have been reached.

"What hospice care itself

acknowledges is the fundamental relatedness and mutual obli
gation of human social membership."14
In an effort to support my premise that society has an
ethical responsibility to provide palliative care for the
terminally ill, it became evident to me that the ethic of
care, as developed initially by Carol Gilligan and later
expanded upon by Nel Noddings, provided the substance for my
argument. These two women were the initial pioneers.

Howev

er, there have been a small, but steady succession of psy
chologists, philosophers, and ethicists who have continued
to refine the concept.

Some have begun speaking the lan

guage of care when discussing care for the dying.

The most

comprehensive approach to theethic of care and public
policy was recently written by Joan C. Tronto.

Where Gill

igan and Noddings were very firm in their beliefs that the
ethic of care was primarily a feminist ethic and could stand
alone to support our moral behaviors, Tronto believes that
it is not just a feminist ethic. It is a perfect complement

5

to round out the shortcomings of a viewpoint based on a
formal concept of justice.
Dr. David J. Roy, in his presentation, "Is Palliative
Care a Matter of Justice?" defines a formal concept of
justice as one in which all beings of a given category
should be treated alike.

The dilemma then becomes:

(1) who

are the beings that belong in the same category and (2) what
is the treatment that they should be given?

Dr. Roy pro

poses that "there is no current theory of justice that can
answer these questions." 15 Furthermore, he proposes that
what is needed is a radically different concept of justice.
I would suggest that rather than developing a new concept of
justice, a complement of justice and care can be used to
support palliative care.
There is support in the literature to substantiate pro
viding palliative care as an ethically sound way to provide
health care for one who is dying. By promoting the ethic of
care along with the principles of justice, individuals and
society in general can be shown the need and see the benefit
of caring for the terminally ill.
I propose that the only way to ensure that palliative
care is a readily available option for all terminally ill,
regardless of whether they are enrolled in a health care
plan or not, is to make the provision of palliative care a
matter of public policy.

"Only when the needs of the dying

receive a reasonable priority in political, economic, and

medical discussions will the financing needed to deliver
hospice services to all in need be assured."16

The fact of

the matter is that in almost all instances the dying will
receive medical care whether it be provided in their home or
in a facility, and those who have no health care coverage
are generally treated in an acute care facility which is the
most cost intensive point of service.

The only question

that remains is whether the care that the dying receive will
be provided by a caring community sensitive to their needs
with an emphasis on symptom control, or will it be an "allo
cation of medical care according to an individual's per
ceived utility or relative worth to society?"17
It is imperative that the progress that has already
been made by those in the hospice movement over the last
twenty years be the foundation for the development of this
policy.

A precedent has already been set by the establish

ment of the Hospice Medicare Benefit in 1983.

Palliative

care is a benefit available to all who are insured under
Medicare.

It is now time to extend that same benefit to all

terminally ill persons.
Chapter 2 will provide a

history of the hospice move

ment with a thorough discussion of palliative care.

Based

on the three desired outcomes of a successful health care
policy (increased access, decreased costs, and increased
quality), several recommendations will be made for develop

ing public policy that includes the provision of palliative
care for the terminally ill.
After a brief discussion of autonomy and justice, chap
ter 3 will take an in-depth look at the ethic of care as
developed by Noddings and Gilligan.

Finally, the possibili

ty of combining justice and care in order to support the
provision of palliative care as public policy will be ex
plored.
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CHAPTER 2
PALLIATIVE CARE AS PUBLIC POLICY

Although palliative care is truly an "old art of medi
cine"1, it is one that is now taking on significant impor
tance as the hospice "movement" comes of age.

Hospice is

gaining recognition and acceptance as a provider of special
ized care for the terminally ill.

With a focus on improving

the quality of care extended to terminally ill patients
while controlling the cost, hospice has achieved two of the
three desired outcomes of health care policy.
component is increasing access.

The third

In most instances these

goals have proven to be conflicting.

However, there is

evidence suggesting that a change in public policy

pro

moting palliative care as the treatment of choice for the
terminally ill would enable hospice to achieve all three
goals of a successful health care policy.
As a background to the discussion of the ethics of
justice vs. care in the hospice movement, this chapter shall
examine the "coming of age" of the discipline of palliative
care and the evolution of the hospice program of care, the
development of its philosophies and standards, conflicts
that surround the delivery of palliative care and the criti
cisms that have been leveled against it.
10

Additionally,
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policy issues will be explored and recommendations will be
proposed.

For the purpose of this discussion, hospice care

and palliative care will be used interchangeably as the hos
pice philosophy espouses the provision of palliative care
services and this interchange of terms is an accepted prac
tice in the literature.
The Coming of Age of Palliative Care

The concept of palliative care has most recently
evolved in three countries:

Great Britain, Canada, and the

United States. Great Britain was the trailblazer by
incorporating hospice benefits into their national health
plan and developing the first specialty training programs in
palliative medicine for physicians.
Approximately 25 years ago, Dame Cicely Saunders opened
St. Christopher's Hospice outside of London.

It was born

from a mission of providing palliative care services to the
terminally ill in a homelike setting, a vision that combined
scientific medicine and nursing with a belief that terminal
care was part of a continuum of treatment, not a sudden
"soft option" (e.g. an excuse for failure on the part of the
medical profession.)2
Dr. Saunders began her hospice work as a volunteer
nurse at St. Luke's Hospital (formerly known as St. Luke's
Home for the Dying Poor).

In order to look at the pain (not

just the physical pain, but the emotional and spiritual
pain) of terminal illness, she completed medical school and
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began as the first full-time doctor at St. Joseph's Hospice.
Dr. Saunders, together with the Sisters of St. Joseph, began
to develop what she called an appropriate way of caring for
the dying.

Saunders emphasized the need for effective

control of symptoms (particularly pain), care of the patient
and family as a unit, an interdisciplinary approach to care,
the use of volunteers, a continuum of care across all treat
ment settings (home, inpatient, other residential), and
follow-up of the family members after the death of the
patient.
The Canadian model of hospice differs from the British,
functioning more like the American model, because it "takes
hospice to the patient rather than the patient to the hos
pice"3. Although there are several prominent Canadian
physicians who are strong advocates of palliative care, the
number of palliative care programs has leveled off and may
even be decreasing.4 However, Canada has the distinction of
developing the first hospital-based hospice in North Ameri
ca, the palliative care unit at the Royal Victoria Hospital
in Montreal.
The fact that hospice care in the U.S. is primarily
home-based, while in England the focus is more facilitybased with some adjunctive home care services, is the prima
ry difference between the two countries.
similarities than differences.

There are far more

The hospice movement began

in this country as a grass roots effort run primarily by
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volunteers. The best known established effort to adapt the
British model of hospice to American health care is the
Branford Hospice at New Haven, Connecticut which opened in
the late 1970's.

In 1983, after conducting demonstration

projects throughout the U. S., Medicare began offering a
hospice benefit to Medicare Part A beneficiaries.

Hospice

has experienced tremendous growth since that time, from 516
hospices in 1983 to over 2000 today, and several authors are
now reporting that hospice has become an accepted part of
the health care system.5
Hospice Philosophy and Standards of Care

The guiding principles of hospice care, initially
emphasized by Dr. Saunders, became the foundation of
Medicare's Hospice Benefit and the Standards of Care as
outlined by the National Hospice Organization.

A signifi

cant issue that the hospice movement has struggled with is
the establishment of a universally accepted definition of
what constitutes palliative care.

If ever the concept is to

be an accepted component of a public policy on health care,
it is imperative that there be acceptance of a single defi
nition.

A definition of palliative care was drafted by the

Standards Committee of the National Hospice Organization
(NHO), the first national trade organization representing
the hospice industry, in order to have a "gold standard" by
which hospice programs could measure their decisions about
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what was appropriate hospice care. Palliative care, as de
fined by NHO is:
treatment that enhances comfort, and improves the
quality of the patient's life. No specific therapy
is excluded from consideration. The test of palli
ative treatment lies in the agreement by the patient,
the physician, the primary caregiver, and the hospice
team that the expected outcome is relief from dis
tressing symptoms, easing of pain, and enhancement of
quality of life. The decision to intervene with an
active palliative treatment is based on the treat
ment's ability to meet the stated goals rather
than its effect on the underlying disease. Each
patient's needs must continue to be assessed and all
treatment options explored and evaluated in the con
text of the patient's values and symptoms.6
In short, hospice care is about choice, with the empha
sis on controlling symptoms and improving the overall quali
ty of life, rather than on the reversal of the basic disease
process.
The hospice emphasis on palliative care, rather than
prolonging life, means that many disorders are not treated
as in other care settings.

"Anemia, infections, and an

orexia, for example, are not treated with transfusions,
antibiotic therapy, or mechanical feeding and hydration."7
The focus is on easing the discomfort caused by symptoms of
the disease process.
Hospice has the distinguishing characteristic of an
interdisciplinary team approach to care.

"The team attempts

to draw together and coordinate the planning and work of all
persons who have contact with the terminally ill in each
specific case."0 Indeed, this concept is so germane to hos
pice, it is one of the Conditions of Participation required
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for a hospice to be certified for reimbursement by Medicare.
The basic hospice team consists of the patient's attending
physician and hospice medical director, nurses, medical
social workers, chaplains, other therapy providers (physi
cal, occupational and nutritional), counsellors, and volun
teers.

In addition, the patient and other family members

are also considered team members. This multidisciplinary
approach is one of the cornerstones of hospice care.
Hospice administrative boards are meant to be multi
disciplinary as well and strive to move in two parallel
directions.
On the one hand to preserve the autonomy, integrity,
and flexibility of the hospice team within the health
care establishment; and, on the other hand, to make
sure that there is adequate representation from hospi
tal administration, influential physicians and nurses,
and to ensure that the program will have the support of
the medical community.9
If the objectives of hospice are to be achieved, it is
imperative that teamwork exists at both levels:

administra

tive and direct patient care.
Factors Influencing the Development of Hospice

It has been said that hospice has grown from the dis
satisfaction of some health care providers with the manage
ment of terminal illnesses in the traditional, acute care
medical model.

It is curious to note that those involved in

hospice care are predominantly female.

The question arises,

was the emergence of hospice influenced by the fact that the
medical establishment was male-dominated?

Advances in medi
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cal technology were now allowing physicians to prolong life
beyond what was ever believed possible, and patients were
not being given a choice to forego life-saving or life-pro
longing therapies in lieu of having symptoms controlled ade
quately and preparing for their eventual deaths.

One of the

primary contributors to patient satisfaction with hospice
care is the direct involvement of the patient in the deci
sion-making (self-determination).

In light of the histori

cally paternalistic approach of the medical profession, this
may

be one of the reasons patients are not routinely in

formed by their physicians that hospice care is an alterna
tive.
Even more significant is that "modern medicine brought
with it a stance toward death that is ambivalent about its
necessity and inevitability."10 In the frenzy to save a
life at any cost, "[T]he whole apparatus of modern hospital
care seems designed to create a nonperson of the 'terminal'
patient and to sequester him as a slightly indecent failure
of modern technology."11 Since hospice was in direct con
flict with what was common medical practice, it is under
standable that it was not readily accepted as mainstream
medical care.

At least one author believes that hospice is

still not at that level of acceptance.

"The movement is at

a crossroads; the future challenge is to become ingrained in
mainstream medicine where terminal care is an automatic part
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of a physician's training, and all hospitals and long-term
institutes offer hospice programs."12
Not to be overlooked is the prevailing attitude of
the general public regarding illness and death.

Generally

speaking, death is not a socially acceptable topic of con
versation.

No longer is death seen as the necessary and

inevitable end point of life.

Philip Aries, French histori

an, has contrasted the concept of a "tame" death that was
"tolerable and familiar, affirmative of the bonds of commu
nity and social solidarity, expected with certainty and
accepted without crippling fear" with the "wild" death of
technological medicine which began to occur in the late 19th
century "marked by undue fear and uncertainty, by the pres
ence of medical powers not quite within our mastery, by a
course of decline that may leave us isolated and degrad
ed. "13 Advances in medical technology have mislead us into
thinking we have a ultimate control over our own mortality.

Criticisms of Hospice

There is a minimal amount of information in the litera
ture that offers criticism of hospice or palliative care.
What was found can be summarized into three categories:
elitism, disrespect for life, and futile care.
A brief, summary of opposing viewpoints was found in an
article, "Criticisms of Hospice" by

Holly Fleischman in

which she cites two primary criticisms of hospice care.
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First, hospice caters to an elite class, "particularly
cancer patients from the white, middle, and upper classes,
who have supportive families."14

While it is true that in

its formative years hospices served cancer patients almost
exclusively, this was not a result of elitist activity.

It

was more a result of limits of the medical profession and
their ability to predict disease outcome with some degree of
certainty.

Because of the somewhat predictable life expec

tancy of cancer patients, oncologists were the primary
supporters of the hospice movement.

Hence, the primary

diagnosis cared for in a hospice program was cancer.

It is

only within the last five to seven years that medicine has
been able to give a more accurate prognosis for other ill
nesses and have recognized the value of hospice care for
these patients as well.

Currently, in most hospice pro

grams, approximately 75% of the patients have cancer as
their diagnosis.

The other 25% is comprised of patients

with cardiac, respiratory and immunological diseases (this
includes AIDS).
The second criticism is that rather than affirming
life, hospice may actually hasten death by not utilizing
life-support equipment.

Furthermore, the hospice program

may be "so emotionally or financially attractive that pa
tients are induced to forego aggressive and curative treat
ment options."15
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In answer to these criticisms it is important to rein
force hospice's goal to affirm life, "providing the dying
every opportunity to live as full a life as possible and to
enjoy as much freedom and control as they are able."16 By
not utilizing life-support equipment, hospice is not injur
ing the patient nor hastening death, but allowing death to
occur naturally as a cause of the particular terminal ill
ness .
With its holistic approach to caring for the patient
and family, hospice is meant to be "emotionally attractive"
to patients.

Currently, this is the only type of care that

provides this much needed support for the dying.

In

addressing the criticism of financial attractiveness, I
would say that the burden should not be placed on hospice to
change.

Caution should be exercised in the development of

health care policy so that hospice is not promoted as a
justification for care-as-conservation of resources.

This,

in fact, would have the potential of inducing patients to
forego other treatment options.
The second reference offering criticism of hospice care
is found in The Hospice Movement by Cathy Siebold.

Again,

hospice was criticized for inhibiting a patient's fight for
life.

The fear is that "if the natural death philosophy

(meaning that death is a natural human experience) comes to
dominate medical practice, for example, the individual who
wants to use every conceivable medical technology to prolong

20

his or her life regardless of cost or efficacy becomes the
odd person out." 16
This is a legitimate fear and has recently become a
topic for discussion in questions surrounding futile care
policies.

Futile care is defined as "any clinical circum

stance in which physicians and their consultants, consistent
with the available medical literature, conclude that further
treatment (except comfort care--palliative care) cannot,
within a reasonable possibility, cure, ameliorate, improve
or restore a quality of life that would be satisfactory to
the patient." 17 The advancement of hospice philosophy is
not what is driving the establishment of futile care poli
cies.

Futile care policies are driven by a need to control

costs and the hope that if there are defined rules that
everyone has theoretically agreed to, patients' rights will
be protected.
Another criticism of hospice care that is not readily
found in the literature is the fact that some programs limit
access to care by requiring patients to have a caregiver in
order to receive hospice services.

Since hospice is

primarily a home care program, it is understandable that a
caregiver in the home is desirable.

It is extremely

difficult to provide services to a terminally ill patient
in a home when there is no one physically present to assist
the patient.

However, it is also not legitimate to deny

services to those without caregivers.

This is truly a
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dilemma for hospice providers and for all who are concerned
about providing quality care for the terminally ill.

Public Policy Issues
The public debate about palliative care focuses on the
issues of choice, cost, outcome and the balance between
quality and cost.

It is incumbent upon the hospice industry

to provide the information needed by consumers and policy
makers to make decisions that will serve the needs of soci
ety.
Choice
Although the issue of choice was addressed in a previ
ous section in more detail, it is important to reiterate
that patients have the right to be able to make informed
choices about the type of treatment they desire.
concept is "informed".

The key

In order for one to make a decision

about treatment options one must have information that is
clear and understandable.

One needs to know about the

consequences of each decision.

For example, if one chooses

to have radiation and chemotherapy as treatment for a par
ticular type of cancer, it is imperative to have knowledge
of not only the side effects but of the success rates with
such treatment.
is an option.

One also needs to know that 'no treatment'
The patient shouold know that this option

exists at every step of the decision-making process, and
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that if no treatment is the option, palliative care is
available.
It has been said that one of the reasons

patients

choose treatment, even when there is a minimal success rate,
is fear of being abandoned by the health care system.

The

symbolic message conveyed by offering curative treatment
only is that patients can only feel truly cared for when the
most modern invasive technologies are applied.

If pallia

tive care is readily available and offered as an option,
that fear can be eased.
Cost of Care

Given the ever-increasing cost of health care in this
country, it is necessary to evaluate the current financial
impact of palliative care and what the ramifications would
be of increasing availability.

Aiken and Marx, in their

writing about hospice and public policy, discuss the unan
ticipated consequences of modifying payment for health
services and the policy debate regarding the provision of
hospice services.

The authors believe that the debate cen

ters around devising methods of payment that will make
needed services accessible without costly duplication of
services or exploitation of the dying by proprietary inter
ests .10
Although studies of hospice care have demonstrated the
cost savings that can be achieved by substituting palliative
care in the home or a hospice facility for aggressive, cure-
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oriented hospital care, some analysts remain worried about
encouraging the growth of a new health care institution that
may add to the public's expense at a time when we are faced
with reducing present commitments for basic health services
for the poor and the elderly.19
The majority of data gathered about the cost-effective
ness of hospice care revolves around the provision of care
as outlined by the Hospice Medicare Benefit (HMB). The Hos
pice Medicare Benefit was the precursor of managed care and
has become a model for providing a comprehensive program of
care for the terminally ill in a cost-effective manner.
Since the first funded demonstration project in the early
1980's, it was recognized that the provision of hospice care
as outlined by Medicare was a cost-effective way to care for
those dying of a terminal illness.

"A major rationale for

hospice reimbursement by Medicare and other insurance pro
grams is the premise that hospice care, by substituting home
care services for hospital inpatient care, is less expensive
than conventional care."20 Several studies have shown that
more than 20% of Medicare expenditures are for terminally
ill patients who are not part of a hospice program, with the
majority of these expenses occurring in the final month of
life.
By contrast, it has been demonstrated that hospice care
provides the greatest savings in the final 1-2 months of
life.

One of the largest studies ever conducted was the

Medicare Hospice Benefit Program Evaluation.

It found that

when a patient was on a hospice program from 30-59 days, a
freestanding hospice saves $1.59 for every $1.00 spent by
Medicare for Part A services.21 A study conducted in 1991
by Nathan Adelson Hospice, Las Vegas, Nevada showed a mini
mum of 40% cost savings over traditional methods of caring
for the terminally ill patient.22
The "Benefit" became available in 1983 as part of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982.
One of the ways in which the HMB achieves cost savings is in
its per diem method of reimbursement.

The agency caring for

the terminally ill patient receives a preset amount of reim
bursement on a daily basis. The rate of reimbursement
differs only according to treatment setting (i.e. home or
inpatient). The only cost for the patient is a 5% copayment
for drugs.

In return, the hospice provides for all the

needs of this patient that pertain to the terminal illness.
For example, the hospice provides all nursing services,
counselling, medications, supplies and medical equipment.
This system of reimbursement allows the hospice team, which
includes the patient and family, to control how and where
care is delivered and makes the hospice accountable for
monitoring the cost of care.
Although the Hospice Medicare Benefit has been proven
to be cost effective, other third party payors have been
less enthusiastic about providing comprehensive hospice

services as a covered benefit. Due to the proliferation of
mandated benefits, many are required to offer a hospice
benefit, but very few offer one that is comparable to that
of Medicare.

The benefit offered in the private sector

usually limits the type and frequency of services as
directed by a representative of the insurance company.
Often services are unbundled and parcelled out in a "Fee for
Service" manner similar to the way traditional home health
care is provided.

This drastically reduces the efficiency

gained by the package of multidisciplinary services as out
lined by the Hospice Conditions of Participation required
for Medicare certification.

When this occurs the cost

saving benefits that could be achieved are lost.
Another difference in the provision of hospice benefits
by third party payors is the imposition of an unrealistic
"cap" or maximum limit on the amount of benefits available.
This can be as low as $2000.

With the average cost of hos

pice home care being about $75 per day and hospice inpatient
care about $350 per day, a $2000 benefit would provide for
approximately 25 days of care at home, or 6 days in a hospice
facility.

Remembering the statistic that the greatest

expenditure for Medicare patients occurs in the final month
of life and that savings from hospice care are highest
during the last 1 - 2 months of life points out the dispari
ty in providing a benefit that limits services at the exact
time when they can be most cost effective.

A limitation of
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this kind encourages patients to utilize less efficient,
more costly forms of care (i.e. hospital emergency rooms,
home health agencies and acute inpatient care).
Although the reasons for resistance to providing rea
sonable reimbursement for hospice services among most pri
vate insurance companies is not quite clear, there are
several possibilities.

(1)There seems to be a lack of

awareness about the advantages of palliative care on the
part of the day-to-day decision makers.

(2)The demand for

services by beneficiaries of private insurance companies is
low.

Private insurers generally provide coverage for a

young, healthy, working population and typically this group
does not give a lot of thought to the possible need for
hospice care.
Outcome

Hospice is about making possible what Weisman calls
"appropriate death."

An "appropriate" death is "one that is

as pain free as possible, permitting an individual a measure
of control and decision-making power that is both possible
and desirable, given the patient's health, value system, and
needs."23 Weisman outlines four conditions that must exist
in order for death to be appropriate:
tance, propriety and timeliness.

awareness, accep

Awareness is about more

than just knowing one has a terminal illness.

It is about

"open awareness" which implies an atmosphere that encourages
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communication and the sharing of ideas, feelings, and expec
tations.
Acceptance of one's death is about an open confronta
tion with whatever problems may arise during the dying
process.

Propriety implies dying in a way that does not

conflict with others' expectations (i.e. having tended to
one's affairs, being as independent as one's situation
allows, and being able to withdraw from others when one
chooses.)

Timeliness reflects the individuals sense of the

"right" or proper time to die.

This usually is contingent

upon completing any "unfinished business."
The hospice benefit encourages involvement as early as
six months before death in order to allow the team to assist
the patient and family in achieving an "appropriate death"
by working through the many anticipatory grief issues that
occur.

Currently the national average length of stay on a

hospice program is only 59 days. This is far less that what
many consider to be adequate to allow for achieving an
"appropriate death."
Quality vs Economy

"The primary debate about hospice focuses on whether
terminally ill people and their families can be better cared
for, in terms of comfort and quality of life, if care is
provided in their homes or in special institutions as op
posed to conventional inpatient institutional medical
care."24 Perceptions of well-being and feelings of discom

28

fort are the two major components of quality of life accord
ing to a comparative study done by Yates, McKegney and Kun
at the Vermont Regional Cancer Center. Perceptions of well
being relate to independence in self-care, desire for food,
and overall assessment of condition.

Discomfort is evaluat

ed by pain, inability to sleep, and other uncomfortable
symptoms.
The National Hospice Study followed 1754 terminal
cancer patients in 40 hospice programs and 14 conventional
care settings during the period 1981-83 and found that
quality of life was similar for patients in hospice and
conventional care.25 However, a secondary analysis of the
data found that the quality of death (the last three days of
life) was significantly better for those in hospice.26 The
criteria identified by patients as being important was
freedom from pain and being able to stay at home.

In

addition, most hospice programs survey surviving family
members to determine levels of family satisfaction with
hospice care.

Anecdotal evidence suggests an overall

satisfaction rate of approximately 95%.

In the past, this

data has not been compiled on a nationwide level.

However,

in 1994, NHO implemented a universal survey tool to measure
satisfaction and will publish the results.
Studies done by W. L. Freeman as an audit of hospital
care for terminal cancer patients reveal a strikingly
different outcome.

"Less-than-optimal" treatment was given
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for pain to 92 percent of the patients, 91 percent for
nausea and vomiting, 100 percent for breathing difficulties
and 93 percent for pulmonary secretions.27 In another
assessment of pain control, Foley states that "physical pain
occurs in from 60 to 90% of advanced cancer patients but is
inadequately controlled in about 25%.1,28
According to Aiken and Marx, in order to justify chang
ing reimbursement patterns two questions must be answered:
1.

Is the impact of hospice care on the quality of

life of the terminally ill and their families as good
or better than conventional arrangements (i.e. acute
hospital care)? and,
2.

If the quality of life is the same or better,

would there be a major change in the cost to insurers?
The results of studies quoted in previous sections make it
clear that hospice has made a tremendous impact on the
quality of life of the terminally ill and their families.
One could make the assumption, given Freeman's horrifying
statistics, that any level of hospice care would result in
better care than what is currently available.

However,

hospice care delivered in its entirety, with all the compo
nent services, provides the best possible solution.
The response to Aiken and Marx's second question is the
subject of ongoing debate.

The argument has been made that

just by making a benefit easily accessible and promoting its
value, the number of people utilizing the benefit will
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increase, hence the cost of providing the care will
automatically increase.

However, in the case of providing a

specialized type of care to those dying of a terminal ill
ness, the argument is not valid for two reasons.
First, the number of people who are dying will not
increase solely on the basis of availability of a benefit.
Although it is true that as the population increases there
is a natural rise in the number of deaths, that is a differ
ent argument.
Second, for the most part, the terminally ill are
receiving care in some form.

More than likely this care is

being provided in a more costly, less palatable manner (i.e.
frequent visits to emergency rooms, reoccurring hospitaliza
tions that probably include the requisite x-rays and lab
tests). Another concern is that some of the care is being
provided by non-profit health care organizations.

This in

turn places a financial burden on the community supporting
the non-profit.

It is legitimate to suggest that if one

allocated all the money being spent to care for the termi
nally ill in non-palliative driven settings to providing
palliative care, there would not be an increase in cost.
Perhaps there would even be a reduction.

I would agree with

Aiken and Marx's premise that if quality of life is the
same, there would be no reason to change reimbursement
patterns.

However, if it is improved, as it is with hospice

care, do we not have a moral obligation to attempt to mobi-
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lize financial resources in order to provide a higher quali
ty of care?
P olicy Recommendations

The discussion in this chapter has focused on the bene
fits of providing palliative care as the treatment of choice
for the terminally ill.

The primary issues have been how to

increase access to care and maintain a high level of quality
without escalating the overall costs.
Reviewing the philosophies and standards of the hospice
industry emphasizes the commitment of the National Hospice
Organization to providing its members the leadership and
direction needed to offer a consistent level of high quality
services.

The conflicts surrounding the implementation of

hospice services have been discussed and the criticisms of
palliative care have been enumerated.
Based on the three desired outcomes of a successful
health care policy (increased access, decreased costs,
increased quality), I am making the following recommenda
tions :
Increased Access

In order to increase access to palliative care, hospice
services must be available for all who are dying of a term
inal illness.

This requires a change at several levels.

First, at the federal level, the Hospice Medicare Benefit
should be preserved and used as a model for other hospice
benefit programs.

Second, at the state level, public
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assistance programs (i.e. Medicaid, Medical, etc.) or state
health care plans, should include hospice care as one of the
available benefits.

Third, all other third party payers

should offer a hospice benefit that is comparable to that of
Medicare.

Fourth, at the community level, a community

based, not-for-profit hospice should be developed and sup
ported through donations in order to provide hospice care
for those who are not included in the other categories.
Education is the second component of increasing access.
Making a hospice benefit available is insufficient; consum
ers of health care and providers (primarily physicians and
nurses) must be educated about the availability and benefits
of hospice care.

It is incumbent upon hospice programs to

work within their local communities to facilitate
discussions about death and dying as well as treatment
choices for the terminally ill.

No one is better equipped

to do this than hospice providers.
Developing curricula for health care providers that
emphasize patient autonomy and teach concepts of death and
dying,

and offer specialty training in palliative medicine

is the second tier of the educational component. One author
suggests a curriculum for physicians in terminal care that
would include instruction in pain and symptom management,
provision of care in various settings (i.e. home, hospital,
hospice, nursing home), communication skills, psychosocial
issues, team interaction, and bioethical issues.29 At the
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very least, these classes should be available as electives.
Teaching physicians how to save lives as well as how to
recognize when a life cannot be saved will require a great
deal of revamping of current medical school curricula.

Even

more problematic may be providing a framework in which
physicians can learn to acknowledge that they must work as
partners with other members of the health care team and that
the patient is also a partner with a voice that must be
acknowledged.
Decreased Costs

Hospice has remained a cost-effective way of caring for
the dying.

With the goal of hospice being to keep people in

the familiarity and comfort of their own or a family
member's home, the number of days spent in acute care set
tings by the terminally ill has decreased with the use of
hospice services.

Persons not enrolled in hospice spent 23

of their last days in the hospital, while patients enrolled
in hospice spend only eight days in acute care settings.30
Since acute care (i.e. hospitals) is the most expensive
treatment setting (approximately $1,756 per day), admitting
patients to hospice programs (approximately $90 per day for
home care and $350 for inpatient care), can decrease the
costs for this specific population.31
The Hospice Medicare Benefit, with its per diem method
of reimbursement, has demonstrated that the cost of care can
be

decreased by providing a holistic approach to the deliv-
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ery of services. I would recommend that the per diem
reimbursement be maintained and that services model the
Hospice Medicare Benefit in order to maintain maximum
efficiency and benefit.
Increased Quality

in order for us, as a nation, to discuss a change in
policy, it is imperative that everyone be speaking the same
language using universally accepted definitions and terms.
The National Hospice Organization's definitions of pallia
tive care and hospice philosophy should be adopted as the
language to be used when speaking of palliative care.

NHO's

membership has spent several years crafting these tools for
exactly this purpose.
Medicare's guidelines for hospice have been in effect
since 1986 and have undergone only one revision.

For nearly

ten years they have been providing hospices with standards
by which to judge the quality of their programs.

They are

well-accepted in the hospice community and have proven to be
beneficial in maintaining quality care.

Adopting the Medi

care Conditions of Participation in conjunction with the
NHO's Standards of Care as benchmarks will provide a uniform
method for measuring and maintaining the quality of care
being provided to the terminally ill.
It will be important to implement safeguards to protect
the rights of the terminally ill to ensure that palliative
care is not used as a justification for care-as-conservation

35

of resources.

Since euthanasia and futile care policies are

being debated more often than ever before, the motivations
for providing palliative care--making possible a "good
death"-- must be constantly reiterated, supported and safe
guarded to ensure that palliative care is not used as a
justification for care-as-conservation of resources.

I

would urge us to supplement the limited terms of the eutha
nasia and futile care debates with a discussion of an ethic
of care as a way to promote humane, compassionate care for
the dying.
I propose that if palliative care, as it is currently
defined by the experts (hospice providers), is made avail
able to all terminally ill persons, it will be the treatment
of choice for most and will not place an undue burden on our
health care system.
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CHAPTER 3
AUTONOMY, JUSTICE AND CARE

An ethic of care has a long-standing and prominent
place in the history of medicine, summarized nicely by the
15th century French adage, "to cure sometimes, to relieve
often, to comfort always."

Nursing literature has articu

lated an ethic of care as a commitment to protecting and
enhancing the patient's dignity, going beyond good inten
tions or simple kindness and including psychologic, philo
sophic or religious, and physical components, taking into
consideration the patient's social context and specific
goals (Fry 1988; Gadow 1985; Watson 1985).1
After a brief discussion of patient autonomy, this
chapter will offer an in-depth look at the ethic of care,
examining its modern-day origin, progression toward accep
tance, and some of the criticisms of it.

In order to accom

plish this, the works of Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings
will be explored in depth with Joan C. Tronto's writings
concerning moral boundaries offering additional support.
The question of whether an ethic of care can singularly
support the provision of palliative care as public policy
or whether it requires a combination of justice and care
will also be explored.
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Autonomy

Personal autonomy has been defined as "the right [of a
person] to bodily integrity, to control his or her own body,
and to define his or her own existence."2 In the case of
the terminally ill, this entitlement protects a person's
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.

"Patients have

a right to know their condition, to choose or reject the
treatment regimen, to choose or reject attempts to prolong
their life, and to decide the disposal of their remains."3
With the acceptance of palliative care within the structure
of organized medicine, control can be given back to the
terminally ill.

With the advent of the Patient Self-Deter

mination Act (PSDA) of 1990, people have an opportunity to
make such decisions prior to entering the health care sys
tem.
As explained later in this chapter, a central
characteristic of caring is the sharing of mutual respect
for the autonomy of both members of the caring relationship.
In the case of palliative care that would be patients and
the health care professionals.

An additional advantage of

this caring relationship with the terminally ill is that
"the process of dying can be a period of moral development
for both the patient and the professional.

By appropriately

caring for patients, members of the team simultaneously can
develop their moral awareness, their character and profess
ional maturity. 1,4
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An Ethic of Care

Ethics is defined as the philosophical study of morali
ty (actual beliefs and practices that we turn to when we
must decide what we ought to do). The principles of ethics
guide us through moral quandaries utilizing moral reason
ing.5 Karl Wellman has defined moral reasoning as "a pro
cess by which one attempts to identify, organize, analyze
and justify human acts in order to determine what is the
right thing to do in a given situation."6 Many ethical
discussions originate from the Greek framework of ethical
theory with a dominant "... focus on virtue and right reason
as central concepts for the moral evaluation of agents and
actions."7
It is Noddings' assessment that ethics has been
discussed largely in the language of the father:

in

principles and propositions, in terms such as justification,
fairness, justice. In proposing her ethic of care, Noddings
argues that human caring and the memory of caring and being
cared for form the foundation of ethical response.

And,

typically, it is in the language of the mother that these
responses are vocalized.®
Some (Noddings 1984; Gilligan 1982; Baier 1987; Blum
1987; Ruddick 1989; Walker 1989) who advocate the recogni
tion of an ethic of care claim that there is a distinct
difference in the way moral reasoning generally occurs in
males and females, and that the ethic of care is reflective

of what has traditionally been categorized as a "feminine"
method of reasoning.9 In this context, "feminine" reflects
the search for women's unique voice that advocates
nurturance, care, compassion and networks of commu
nication.10 It is important to note that this discussion is
not meant to imply that there is no place for men in this
ethical concept.

There is, however, the implication that

what Kohlberg saw as the traditional method of masculine
moral reasoning, based on an ethic of justice, stressing
rules and rights, is in direct contrast to the ethic of
care.
The beginnings of those ideas of a 'female ethic',
'feminine1 nature, and specifically female forms of virtue
which have formed the essential background to a great deal
of feminist thinking about ethics can be traced back to the
eighteenth century.11 It was during this time that
industrializing cities saw the emergence of questions about
femininity and female consciousness arising from the changes
in women's social situations. "A subordinate but virtuous
and idealized wife and mother, whose specifically female
virtues both defined and underpinned the private sphere of
domestic life, came to dominate a great deal of eighteenth
and nineteenth century thought."12 Since these first
inferences to an ethic of care there has been a progression
not only in how to think about it, but also as to what
place, if any, it has in the hierarchy of moral theories.
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In a short time, philosophical writers have taken the ethic
of care from a feminine theory to a feminist theory to a
holistic ethic13 to "an adequate theory of how we might make
human societies more moral."14
For Noddings, when individuals (male or female) adopt
an ethic of care, they base their judgements and actions on
their relationships with and responsibilities to other
individuals. If one subscribes to the idea that a point of
morality is to establish a world in which we remain in
relation to one another, caring is taken to be the very
foundation of the ethical.

This concept "of care as an

ethical orientation and its contrast to the patriarchal
preference for individual rights and justice has powerful
impact on many fields...and has garnered an enthusiastic
international following."15
Gilliqan vs. Kohlberq

The first discussions of an ethic of care were the
result of Carol Gilligan's work wherein she described what
she calls the "different voice" of women.

She challenged

Lawrence Kohlberg's work on moral reasoning and launched an
important debate about the gender boundary implicit in
Kohlberg's theory.16
His goal was to explain the development of moral rea
soning by posing hypothetical moral dilemmas to his sub
jects, initially young boys at a preparatory school and
later, young girls at a private academy.

"His work has been
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viewed as the definitive account of moral development and it
has had a large influence on psychologists, educators, and
political philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas and John
Rawls."

(Kohlberg's theory of moral development is alluded

to in Rawls's A Theory of Justice .)17
An individual1s response to various moral scenarios
expresses, according to Kohlberg, the level of moral devel
opment of that person.

The classic example of a moral

dilemma, cited in most discussions of Kohlberg, is known as
the Heinz dilemma.

Heinz lives in a faraway country with

his wife who is sick.

The pharmacist in his town has a drug

that can make his wife well; without the drug she will die.
Heinz cannot afford the drug, and the pharmacist refuses to
give it to him unless he can pay for it.

The dilemma:

should Heinz steal the drug?18
Kohlberg devised this dilemma as one in a series in
order to measure moral development in adolescents by
presenting a conflict between moral norms and exploring the
logic in their ability to resolve such dilemmas.

"Kohlberg

believes that there are definitive stages of moral develop
ment and, moreover, that there is a measure of congruence
between it [moral development] and psychological development
with regard to cognitive skills."19
Kohlberg established six stages, two stages in each
level, to categorize moral development.

The stages in the

pre-conventional level are, (1) "heteronomous morality," the

amoral stage of avoiding punishment, and (2)"individualis
tic, instrumental morality," where one acts and expects a
similar response.

Stages three and four, (3)"interpersonal-

ly normative morality," the "good boy" stage, and (4)"social
system morality," expands the audience to whom one's moral
judgements are oriented.

The range extends from people who

are the closest to you to abiding by the rules and judge
ments of others as extended to the entire community.20
The third level, labeled post-conventional and princi
pled, includes stage five, the stage of prior rights and
social contract, and stage six, "morality of universalizable, reversible, and prescriptive general ethical princi
ples."21 At stage five, one is concerned that "laws and
duties to society be based upon the ideal of the greatest
good for the greatest number."

As a rational creature, "one

is obligated to abide by the precepts, which embrace life
and liberty, to which one had otherwise agreed."
seen as a utilitarian moral theory.

This is

If one has developed to

the ultimate level of stage six, it is accepted that "there
are universal ethical principles that all should follow, and
which take priority over all legal and other institutional
obligations."22

The person is no longer ruled by self-

interest, the opinion of others, or the force of legal
convention, but by self -legislated and self-imposed univer
sal principles such as those of justice, reciprocity and
respect for the dignity of human beings as intrinsically
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valuable persons.

Stage six is based on a deontological

theory of morality. According to Kohlberg, very few people
reach the post-conventional stages; the estimate is approxi
mately five per cent.
Although Kohlberg's study involved many pre-adolescent
students, the results of his interviews with two eleven year
olds (one boy and one girl) are most frequently used as
typical examples of how this theory is applied.

Given the

Heinz dilemma, the young boy decides that the husband should
steal the medication, seeing it as a conflict between the
values of property and life.

This, decision is considered to

be conventional (a mixture of stages three and four) for the
boy's age and cognitive development.

Kohlberg feels that

"his ability to bring deductive logic to bear on the solu
tion of moral dilemmas, to differentiate morality from
law,and to see how laws can be considered to have mistakes,
points toward the principled conception of justice that
Kohlberg equates with moral maturity."23
The young girl's response is quite different.

She does

not believe that the drug should be stolen; neither does she
think the wife should be allowed to die.

She contends that

there should be discussion between the husband and
pharmacist and thinks that another solution could be worked
out. Perhaps the husband could pay for the drug over a
period of time.

Her solution lies in a further examination

of the relationships involved:

wife to husband, husband to

wife, pharmacist to community.

In light of Kohlberg's

stages, the girl is scored at a full level lower than the
boy is.

"Scored as a mixture of stages two and three, her

responses seem to reveal a feeling of powerlessness in the
world, an inability to think systematically about the con
cepts of morality or law, a reluctance to challenge authori
ty or to examine the logic of received moral truths."24
Kohlberg found her reliance on relationships and her belief
in communication as the mode through which to resolve moral
dilemmas a sign of dependence, vulnerability and naivety.
She is thought to be in the pre-conventional stage.
It is from this point that Gilligan begins to develop
her theory of a "different voice."

Gilligan sees the girl's

response as a demonstration of "awareness of the connection
between people that gives rise to a recognition of responsi
bility for one another, a perception of the need for re
sponse;" a sense of community.25 Seen in this light, the
girl's understanding of morality as arising from the recog
nition of relationship, her belief in communication as the
mode of conflict resolution, and her conviction that the
solution to the dilemma will follow from its compelling
representation seem far from naive or cognitively
immature."26 Rather, these insights seem to reflect the way
women, either instinctively or by virtue of conditioning,
make moral decisions and are central to an ethic of care.

Gilligan believes that the difference in logic used by
the young girl and the boy stems from the way they interpret
the question.

The young boy considers whether or not the

person should act in the proposed dilemma while the young
girl interprets "how" one should act.

Furthermore,

Gilligan's work attempts to substantiate her claim that when
one studies the moral development of women, a process emerg
es that is quite different from Kohlberg's six stages.
Namely, "the moral problem arises from conflicting responsi
bilities rather than from competing rights and requires for
its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and
narrative rather than formal and abstract."27 This concept
of morality, as concerned with the activity of care, centers
moral development around the understanding of responsibility
and relationships, just as the concept of morality as fairn
ess ties moral development to the understanding of rights
and rules.

"Traditionally, many psychologists and philoso

phers have reasoned from an androcentric point of view,
seeing women's moral inferiority where they should have seen
women's moral difference."28
Gilligan's account of women's moral development has
three stages that are traversed, with the third assuming
moral maturity.

At level one, the self is the sole object

of a woman's concern.
phasis on others.

In level two, she moves to an overem

Finally, level three is a proper emphasis

on self in relation to others.

"A woman attains moral
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maturity when she stops opposing her needs in favor of
others, simultaneously recognizing the falseness of this
polarity and the truth of her and others['] interconnected
ness .1,29
A work by Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries, critically
examines the works of both Kohlberg and Gilligan.

Her

criticism of Kohlberg is that his theory of moral develop
ment is hierarchical in its stages based on the fact that
"an individual's progress through successive stages of moral
development requires that his or her sense of moral
reciprocity deepens.

Reciprocity deepens through the abili

ty of an individual to assume different roles.

Thus, moral

development, though a cognitive process, is dependent upon
certain kinds of social stimulation in order to occur."30
Although Tronto does not support Kohlberg's assump
tions, she also takes exception to Gilligan's premise of a
different voice being feminine, an alternative way to
conceive of morality.

She sees it as an account of partial

privilege that only reinforces the existing moral boundaries
and deemphasizes the need for change in our concept of
gender roles.

"Women presumed to speak in a different moral

voice are both partially privileged yet ultimately excluded
from the loftiest type of moral thinking."31 Designating a
different voice as a woman's morality only supports the
notion that men and women have different moral capacities.
Because of the assumption that those who are in power are at
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a higher level of moral development and, therefore, morallyprivileged,

women advocating speaking in a "different"

moral voice inadvertently place themselves in the disadvan
taged category since they are generally not the ones in the
privileged positions.

Putting oneself in this position pro

vides no incentive for promoting an ethic of care.
Tronto believes that there is equal necessity for both
care and justice orientations for a full and proper morali
ty; "women need not be the bearers of a women's morality;
but in order for all people, men and women alike, to be
fully human, it is necessary that all possess both the
orientations of justice and Gilligan's ethic of care."32
Nel Noddinqs1 Approach to Caring

Just two years after the publication of Gilligan's
work, Nel Noddings, an Associate Professor of Education at
Stanford University, published her book, Caring. A Feminist
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.

Her intent was to

produce an essay in practical ethics from the feminine view,
rooted as it is in relation and identifying joy as a basic
human affect.

"Joy" is described as a feeling, rather than

an emotion, and is considered a reflective mode of con
sciousness.

It is the recognition of and longing for relat

edness that form the foundation of this ethic, and the joy
that accompanies fulfillment of our caring enhances our
commitment to the ethical ideal that sustains us as the
'one-caring'.

In the caring relationship, both parties con-
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tribute:

the 'one-caring' and the 'cared-for'.

In order

for the relation to be described as caring, one's caring
must be completed in the other.

The natural caring which is

described as "the human condition that we, consciously or
unconsciously, perceive as good" provides the motivation of
ethical caring.

The perceived "good" is the condition

toward which we strive, "and it is our longing for caring-to be in the special relation--that provides the motivation
for us to be moral."

Noddings says "relation will be taken

as ontologically basic and the caring relation as basically
ethical."

She recognizes human encounter and affective

response as basic facts of human existence.

We want to be

moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to
enhance the ideal of ourselves as 'one-caring.'33
Although Noddings presents caring from what she refers
to as the "feminine" view ("feminine in the deep classical
sense--rooted in receptivity, relatedness and responsive
ness, in the way that some believe women reason morally")34,
this is not to say that all women will accept it or that men
will reject it.

What she is saying is that men and women

can and must learn how to care if they are to become moral
beings.

This concept is supported by Rosemarie Tong when

she says "an ethic of care can be communicated just as
effectively as an ethic of rules and principles."35
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The 'One-caring'

Caring involves, for the 1one-caring', a "feeling with"
the other.

This is seen as having two distinctive features:

engrossment and motivational displacement.

Engrossment is

characterized as a receptive mode of consciousness charac
terized by absorption and sensory concentration in which "we
receive what is there as nearly as possible without [self]
elevation or assessment."36 Engrossment is not restricted
to only the emotional.

"There is a characteristic and

appropriate mode in caring."

This appropriate mode of

consciousness is a switch "from an assimilatory mode to a
receptive-intuitive mode which allows us to receive the
object, to put ourselves quietly in its presence."

This is

clearly different from the "analytic-objective mode in which
we impose structure on the world." Motivational displace
ment means that we apprehend the other's reality so that,
"when we see the other's reality as a possibility for me, we
must act to eliminate the intolerable, to reduce the pain,
to feel the need to actualize the dream."37
Functioning as the 'one-caring' requires more than
feeling.

A motivational shift is needed.

One does not

relinquish herself, but allows her energy to be at the
service of the one for whom she is caring.
the receptive or relational mode.

It is a shift to

Noddings believes the

receptive mode is at the heart of human existence, with
existence defined in the existential sense of living with
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heightened awareness to include awareness of and commitment
to what we are doing and what we are living. As the 'onecaring, ' one receives the other into herself and sees and
feels with the other, becoming a duality.

However, "I am

not caused to see or feel--that is, to exhibit certain
behavioral signs interpreted as seeing and feeling--for I am
committed to the receptivity that permits me to see and to
feel in this way." 38 The 'one-caring' sees the best self in
the 'cared-for1 and works with her to actualize that self.
Undoubtedly, at times, the 'one-caring' will shift out
of this mode in a response to converting what we have re
ceived from the other into a problem, something to be
solved.

At this point, we move away from the cared-for in

an attempt to objectively analyze, study and interpret the
data of the cared-for's reality.

These "turning points", as

Noddings refers to them, are entirely appropriate as long as
we recognize the shift.

She describes it as keeping our

objective thinking tied to a relational stake at the heart
of caring,

when we fail to do this, we lose ourselves as

one-caring focusing on the problem rather than the person.
Concentric Circles of Caring

According to Noddings, those who are 'one-caring' find
themselves at the center of a concentric circle of caring.
It begins with caring for oneself and expands to those we
may never actually know.
circle, we care

For those who are in the inner

because we love them.

They are usually
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family or close friends.

As we move outward, there are

those for whom we have personal regard, such as neighbors
and colleagues.

The "guidelines" for these relationships

are a reflection of "someone's sense of relatedness institu
tionalized in our culture."39
Beyond this group are those one has not yet encoun
tered.

They may be linked to the inner circle by such means

as spouses of children.
these people.

One must be prepared to care for

"Chains of caring are established, some

linking unknown individuals to those already anchored in the
inner circles and some forming whole new circles of poten
tial caring.

I am prepared to care through recognition of

these chains."40
Noddings discusses the dilemma of the stranger who is
not bonded through the chains of caring.
posed to respond?

How are we sup

Her answer is to remain receptive.

"In

an important sense, the stranger has an enormous claim on
me, because I do not know where he fits, what requests he
has a formal right to make, or what personal needs he will
pass on to me."

Aware of one's limitations, there may be a

fear of a request that cannot be met without hardship.
Is it appropriate to establish caring chains with
trust, rather than love, as the affective link?
believes it is.

Noddings

For example, one may not be able to person

ally be present for the health care needs of those in the
community, but one can respond to an appeal for public sup
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port for an allocation of dollars for improvements in the
provision of health care by someone in whom one trusts.

In

Tronto's discussion of caring, she makes a distinction
between "caring about" and "taking care of".

This will be

given more attention later on.
The 'Cared-for1

What is the responsibility, if any, of the 'cared-for1
in the relationship?

Noddings would say the 'cared-for'

responds to the presence of the 'one-caring' with caring
being completed in all relationships through the apprehen
sion of caring by the 'cared-for.' "The attitude that is
perceived by the 'cared-for' as caring is generated by ef
forts of the 'one-caring' at inclusion and confirmation."41
When this attitude is missed, the one who is the recipient
of care-taking feels like an object.
The concept of reciprocity surfaces again in the dis
cussion of the 'cared-for.'

As previously mentioned, in

order for caring to be actualized, there must be recognition
on the part of the 'cared for.' This does not mean that the
'cared-for' must also care for the 'one-caring.' Although
it is true that mutual caring can occur, that is not what is
meant by reciprocity.
Referring to the concept of engrossment,

a receptive

mode of consciousness helps describe reciprocity.

It occurs

when the 'cared-for' acknowledges and responds to the par
ticular form of engrossment in the 'one-caring.'

In order

to "behave ethically in the potential caring relation, the
'cared-for' must turn freely toward his own projects, pursue
them vigorously, and share his accounts of them spontaneous
ly."42 Additionally, by sharing aspirations, appraisals and
accomplishments, the 'one-caring' has a fuller knowledge of
what the 'cared-for' is striving toward and more readily
supports these efforts.

"The motivational displacement of

caring occurs naturally, supported by any responsiveness of
the 'cared-for.'

The 'one-caring' for a fully participating

'cared-for' is sustained and invigorated and her caring is
unlikely to deteriorate to cares and burdens."
The freedom, creativity and spontaneous disclosure of
the 'cared-for' that manifests itself under the nurturing of
the 'one-caring' completes the relationship.43 Even when
one cares, if the 'cared-for' does not feel it or believe
it, Noddings claims that the relationship cannot be charac
terized as caring.

This points out a limit of caring.

The Ethical Self

Noddings believes that the ethical self is an active
relation between one's actual self and a vision of one's
ideal self as 'one-caring' and 'cared-for.' One's ideal
self, as 'one-caring,' comes about as a result of the good
ness that is felt when one accepts and affirms the internal
"I must".

The "I must" is described as the natural impera

tive that arises "directly and prior to consideration of
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what it is that I might do" as I receive the other.

"This

vision of what I might be is the genuine product of car
ing."44 In other words, it is the moral imperative. This
goodness, according to Noddings, is an assessment of the
state of natural caring, some degree of which each of us has
been dependent upon for our continued existence.
My caring for others and their caring for me enables me
to care for myself.

This allows me to "receive the vision

of what I might be, enabling the 'I must1 to arise with
respect to the ethical self."

My acceptance and affirmation

of this caring for self will commit me to strive toward the
other in spite of feelings of doubt, aversion or apathy.
Summoning a concern for the ethical self is what prompts the
"I must" in situations where it would not arise naturally.
If I did not care for my physical well-being, I would not be
able to appreciate the efforts of those who care for me.
Noddings suggests that the answer to the question, "why
should I behave morally?" is because I am or want to be a
moral person.

She believes that the interest in moral

behavior arises out of our natural impulse to care.
Moral Boundaries

A more recent look at the ethic of care by Joan Tronto
takes the concept one step further.

Tronto sees the ethic

of care as more than a discussion of "women's morality".
This way of thinking leads some to believe that it is not
part of the realm of moral choice, but merely a discussion

of values that are traditionally associated with women.
These values are described as attentiveness, responsibility
«r

nurturance, compassion, and meeting others' needs.

It is

Tronto's position that these values are traditionally ex
cluded from public consideration and "tied to the 'natural
ness' of women's caring, that is either instinctive, or
deeply social or cultural behavior."45

In order to include

an ethic of care in our definition of a good society, it
will be imperative to move these values from our private
lives into a political context.

It is upon this premise

that I suggest that the ethic of care can provide the sup
port needed to establish a policy of access to and endorse
ment for palliative care.
It is Tronto's belief that care is a universal aspect
of human life; "it is not universal with regard to any
specific needs, but all humans have needs that others must
help them meet.

Several scholars have argued that what we

care about defines who we are as people and as unique indi
viduals."46 Tronto sees the ongoing process of caring
divided into four phases:

'caring about','taking care of',

'care-giving', and 'care-receiving'.
phases are four ethical elements:

Within these four

attentiveness, respon

sibility, competence, and responsiveness.
'Caring about' is noting that a need exists and making
an assessment that this need should be met. It is highly
individual and usually culturally shaped.

For example,
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hospice relies heavily on the use of volunteers.

They are

considered a core service and are a requirement for Medicare
certification.

Upon hearing a public service announcement

requesting volunteers, one person may acknowledge that this
is a legitimate need.

Another may comment about what a

waste it would be to spend time with someone who is dying,
preferring instead to spend time with a youth organization
because he could see the results of his efforts.
In order to be able to care about the needs of others,
one must be attentive, accepting the fact that others mat
ter.

Tronto believes that our society has an unparalleled

ability to "know" about others due to the proliferation and
availability of information; and yet, the temptation is in
creasingly to shut others out and focus only on our own
needs.
1Taking care of' is the next step and involves assuming
responsibility and determining how to respond.

One does not

necessarily need to assume personal responsibility.
more recognizing that some action can be taken.

It is

'Taking

care' of generally involves an agency that bears the respon
sibility.

Tronto views responsibility as both central and

problematic requiring constant reevaluation.
is not to be confused with obligation.

Responsibility

Obligations general

ly arise from promises we have made or formal/legal bonds;
responsibility comes from implicit cultural practices.
"Ultimately, responsibility to care might rest on a number
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of factors; something we did or did not do has contributed
to the needs for care, and so we must care."47 Responsibil
ity can also have different meanings depending on one's
gender roles.

For example, traditionally women have had the

responsibility for care-giving.
When extending this idea of responsibility vs. obliga
tion to a physician's role in the care of the terminally
ill, it may illuminate a physician's dilemma in choosing be
tween advocating continuation of curative forms of treatment
or palliative care.

Perhaps the ability to recommend pal

liative care hinges on whether the physician sees her role
as one of responsibility rather than one of obligation.
Undoubtedly, the physician feels a sense of responsibility
for the patient's well-being.

However, if the physician has

a sense of obligation, feeling that there is an imminent
commitment to do everything in her power to prevent the
death of a patient, she may find it unethical to suggest
palliative care.

This could be construed as a breach of

faith between the physician and patient.
In her argument for the inclusion of care as a politi
cal and philosophical notion, Tronto is suggesting "that we
are better served by focusing on a flexible notion of re
sponsibility than we are by continuing to use obligation as
the basis for understanding what people should do for each
other."40 This suggests that performing

out of obligation

provides one with less opportunities for flexibility in
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decision making.

However, caring encompasses responsibili

ties that go beyond obligation.

This flexible notion would

give a physician a kind of "permission" to offer palliative
care and recognize that this demonstrates responsible behav
ior that is concerned with a patient's well-being.
'Care-giving' is about the personal responsibility to
directly meet the needs for care.

It involves physical

work, and for this reason, providing money for care is not
considered to be care-giving; rather, it is taking care.
This distinction is crucial to her argument.

It has been

our history to relegate those with care-giver status to a
position of lesser value and, at the same time, to perceive
the allocation of money, either private donations or public
funds as a form of care-giving. Tronto believes that the
fact "that we quickly equate in the United States the provi
sion of money with the satisfaction of needs points to the
undervaluing of care-giving in our society."49 This differs
from Noddings' 'one-caring' in that Noddings' classification
encompasses both 'taking care of' and 'care-giving.'

The

contribution of money or other resources to providing care
does not, in Noddings' opinion, diminish the value of the
effort.
Tronto argues that a paradigm shift is necessary.

We

must move from accepting care as necessary, but delegating
it to others of a particular gender or social class, to a
premise that holds care as a process by which life is sus-
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tained and therefore placed at the center of our moral and
political universe.

In other words, instead of placing the

responsibility for caring on others who are generally
considered to be of a lower social status, each of us must
accept responsibility for being 'care-givers.'
Competence in care-giving is seen as a moral notion.
If one intends to provide care, accepts the responsibility
for it, but does not provide good care, Tronto would say the
need for care is not met.

The only exception would be if

the resources were not available to the caregiver.

For

example, a spouse who is himself debilitated may not be able
to provide competent care for his ill partner.

This

situation begs the question, should the community (in this
context, community means through the provision of public
funds) take responsibility for care-giving and could this be
accomplished within the current budget constraints.

In the

recent attempts to provide universal access to health care,
one of the primary deterrents was the ability to finance
this care.
The issue of how competency is determined can be very
controversial.

Who will set the standards?

Should it be

done through peer review, government oversight, community
oversight, or a combination of all of these?

Currently,

entities such as state medical and nursing boards set the
standards for practitioners and federal agencies such as
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Health Care Finance Administration set certification guide
lines based on standards of care.
In Tronto's final phase of caring, 'care-receiving', it
is recognized that the object of care will respond to the
care it receives.

Tronto is concerned that if the evaluat

ion of the care received is not examined from the perspec
tive of the recipient, how care-givers choose to meet the
perceived needs may cause new problems.

Responsiveness,

considering the other's position as that person expresses
it, is the moral element that prevents this potential prob
lem.

This issue is of particular concern when dealing with

providing pain medication for palliation.

Far too often a

physician or nurse will take the position that a patient
does not really need his pain medication based on the care
givers perception of pain and/or beliefs about addiction.
Hospice has taken on the additional responsibility of edu
cating professionals and lay people about the need to treat
a patient's pain or other uncomfortable symptoms as the
patient desires.

This may even mean providing no relief if

that is the patient's preference.
By its very nature, care deals with conditions of
vulnerability and inequality.

This is the position in which

the 'care-receiver' finds herself.

Tronto contends, " [T]he

moral precept of responsiveness requires that we remain
alert to the possibilities for abuse that arise with vulner
ability. "50 Being at the end of one's life as a result of a
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terminal illness epitomizes vulnerability.
for abuse is readily apparent.

The potential

This is frequently an issue

in the decision making process of the terminally ill when
faced with the choice of continuing therapy or electing pal liative care.

It has been reported that patients are con

cerned about disappointing their physicians who have been
working very hard to control the progression of the disease.
Patients have said that there is a sense, on their part,
that if they do not continue to engage in curative treat
ment, they are not putting forth all of their effort.

By

selecting palliative care they perceive themselves as "giv
ing up" and fear their physicians will do the same.
There are many other examples of the vulnerability
felt by one who is dying, such as the conflict of wanting to
maintain control over the daily events of one's life and
accepting the fact that the eventuality of death cannot be
controlled.
Moral Pilemmas in Caring

Tronto recognizes that there are moral dilemmas that
are specific to the universality of an ethic of care.

She

outlines these as difficulty in assessing needs, parochial
ism, sublimated needs of care-givers, detached care, other
ness, paternalism and privileged irresponsibility.
Since the needs for care are infinite and the resourc
es, both personal and public, are finite, there will always
be moral dilemmas.

Tronto argues that the problem of deter

mining which needs should be met requires a theory of jus
tice to determine the degree of urgency of the needs.
However, Rawls' theory of distributive justice, according to
Tronto, requires that one view the assessment of needs from
the perspective of 1caring about' and 'taking care of'.

In

other words, not as one who will provide care but from the
detached perspective of recognizing that a need exists and
determining how the need should be responded to. The harm in
this perspective is that the 1care-givers' and perhaps even
more importantly, the ’care-receivers', are excluded from
the process of prioritizing the needs.

To illustrate this

point, let us remember how decisions about health care are
made in the context of a health maintenance organization
(HMO). A "gatekeeper" system is used.

Patients who are

insured by an HMO are first seen by the lowest level of
professional in the physician hierarchy, the physician's
assistant (P.A.).

The P.A. determines whether or not the

patient requires the skill of a physician.

If so, this

physician will be a general practitioner who will then
decide whether or not to refer to a specialist.

The system

encourages care to be provided at the least costly level
possible.

The HMO created this system from the detached

perspective of recognizing that a need existed and deter
mined how it should be responded to.

Neither physicians

(care-givers) nor patients (care-receivers) participated.
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In a revision of this system, physicians may be asked to
contribute but patients probably will not.

'Care-receivers'

as participants in decision making are generally devalued
because they are considered to be the needy.
help of all of the others.

They need the

Tronto recommends, " [A]ny con

cept of needs must account for the concrete nature of needs
and how they are met through care, and must also contain
some way to make judgments about the worthiness of competing
needs".
The issues of parochialism and sublimated needs of
caregivers are at opposite ends of the moral dilemma spec
trum.

On one hand, the concern for parochialism arises from

the fact that care requires more than an abstract involve
ment. It is not enough to 'care about' and 'take care of'.
However, the requirement to be a 'care-giver' and 'care-receiver' can lead one to be so narrowly focused that one
loses the ability to address more global concerns.

For

example, if I am caring for someone who is dying, I will be
so consumed in my caring that I will have no concern for
those who may be dying without someone to care for them.
Tronto suggests that it is reasonable to expect some form of
partiality, particularly during times of intense care-giv
ing.
On the other hand, when providing care, there is often
a struggle between the needs of the care-giver and the needs
to be met.

A considerable level of anger can accumulate on

both sides.

The care-giver often must sublimate her needs

for the one for whom she is caring.

This can result not

only in subverting the process of care, but ultimately could
result in denying or withholding care.

From the 'care-

receiver's' perspective, there is often a resentment at
having to depend upon another for care.

Tronto believes

that since the ethic of care acknowledges this dilemma as a
potentially serious moral problem, it is more likely to be
able to solve these types of problems than other ethical
perspectives.
This dilemma is seen very frequently in the hospice
setting.

Generally, patients become part of a hospice

program of care after a lengthy illness.

There may have

been a reversal of roles (i.e. the wife, who has been the
care-giver in the family, is now the care-receiver.)
The roles of the care-giver and care-receiver have been
firmly established and both parties have been feeling the
emotions previously described.

Because hospice philosophy

encompasses treating the patient (care-receiver) and family
(care-givers) as a unit, it is well equipped to deal with
these very real issues.

Providing patients and family

members with support and counseling to assist them in re
solving such issues is a part of the delivery of hospice
services.

There are minimal resources within the tradition

al medical model for these types of services due to costs.
However, in hospice, within the daily rate of reimbursement,
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these services are not only readily available, but are
encouraged and provided at no extra cost.
Another dilemma with care is the perception of "others"
who are recipients of detached care.

Taking a global per

spective, it is not possible to provide care to all for whom
one might feel some responsibility.

Therefore, individuals

often take care of much more than they give of direct care.
As those who are being taken care of become more distant, it
is easier to relegate them to the status of being "those
other people" for whom we are not required to be responsi
ble.

Presumably, the theory of reciprocity should assist us

by allowing us to put oneself into the "other's" situation.
However, Tronto asserts that since we are not able to com
prehend all the dimensions of the other's position, the more
likely result is that there will be an incomplete under
standing rather than a morally sensitive response.

An

example of this would be someone who is heterosexual attemp
ting to put oneself in the position of a homosexual dying
from AIDS.

That person may be sympathetic to the situation,

but probably cannot put himself into the other's situation.
Tronto turns to Aristotle for support in this area. Ari
stotle's philosophy about an ultimate good for the sake of
which all other goods are pursued, suggests this standard:
"since the task of care is to maintain, continue, and repair
the world so that we can live in it as well as possible, we
should do what will best achieve this end."51 If we can
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relegate caring to the position of being an ultimate good,
we can then acknowledge the fact that all people will be
either in the position of being a 'care-giver' or 'carereceiver'.

By recognizing this inevitability, we can than

move to accept that by virtue of our position (care-giver or
care-receiver) a kind of inequality will emerge. Tronto
suggests "that a moral theory that can recognize and identi
fy these issues is preferable to a moral theory that, be
cause it presumes all people are equal, is unable even to
recognize them. "S2
The issue of paternalism is very closely related to the
inequality issue.

"Caring does not occur between two equal

and autonomous actors.

There is a dependency relationship

of one upon another."53 The risk is that the perception of
the needs of the 1care-receivers' will become more defin
itive than the actual needs.

Caring must "go beyond good

intentions or simple kindness and...take into consideration
the patient's social context and specific goals."54 There
is a danger that those who receive care will lose their
autonomy and their sense of independence.
Privileged responsibility takes the problem of pater
nalism one step further.

if one accepts that the caring

needs of some groups are met more completely than others and
is concerned that this pattern follows the distribution of
power in society, one can see the danger in privileged
responsibility.

There seems to be nothing to inhibit the

relatively powerful (most likely the 'care-givers'), from
defining their needs as more important than those of the
care-receivers. And, by looking only at whether or not their
needs are being met as a measure of their caring responsi
bilities, they will have no reason to examine the situation
from any other perspective.

Tronto points out that in the

context of the American ideology of individualism, universal
morality is not an automatic solution to this problem.
The founders of hospice recognized this risk and
developed a philosophy to safeguard against it.

The hospice

guidelines issued by Medicare and the National Hospice
Organization explicitly include the patient and the family
as members of the Interdisciplinary Group in order to pre
vent them from being excluded in the decision-making pro
cess.

However, there is often a difference between the

ideal situation and reality.

The fact that physicians,

nurses and other of the "helping" professions are also part
of the Interdisciplinary Group makes the potential for
detached care, otherness and paternalism very real.

The

fact that these issues are identified in an ethic of care as
moral questions that must be acknowledged and dealt with
allows one to feel hopeful.

If one supports care as the

foundation of the provision of palliative care, it provides
reassurance that a system of checks and balances will be in
place to safeguard against abuse.
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Every moral theory has its problematic areas.

Often

the debate about an ethic of care is whether or not it is
compatible with other theories of moral reasoning.

Tronto

suggests that if one only looks at the different metaethical
perspectives of, for example, care and justice, "any at
tempts to make the two compatible are viewed as philosophi
cally unsophisticated."55 However, if we combine the
principle that care is necessary with the particular prac
tices of providing care in a given situation, compatibility
can be achieved.
JUSTICE

"The distributive logic of the practice of medicine
seems to be this: that care should be proportionate to
illness and not to wealth."56 However, in reality, care is
not always proportionate to illness, and very often it is
dependent upon the physician's perspective and the patient's
insurance benefits or lack thereof.
If one accepts the theory of justice as "belonging to
the domain of obligation rather than to the domain of chari
ty and as being concerned with giving people what they
deserve or should rightfully possess,"57 one can begin to
understand the inability of justice to support the provision
of palliative care.

When decisions are made from a position

of justice as fairness, we can suppose that the decision
makers come from "a position wherein they are cooperating on
terms to which they would agree if they were free and equal
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persons whose relations with respect to one another were
fair.

They could all view their arrangements as meeting the

stipulations which they would acknowledge in an initial
situation that embodies widely accepted and reasonable
constraints on the choice of principles."58 Theoretically,
this provides the basis for public acceptance.
Rawls determined that justice as fairness consists of
two parts:

(l)

an interpretation of the initial situation

and of the problem of choice that itposes, and (2) a set of
principles

which would

be agreed to.

This has come to be

known as the contract theory.59 A key principle so chosen
would be:

"All social primary goods--liberty and opportuni

ty, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect--are to
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any
or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favored.1,60 Rawls has built his theory of justice on the
foundation of Kant's theory.

Decisions are made from the

"original position" behind a "veil of ignorance."

Rawls

believes "we can say that when persons act on these princi
ples they are acting in accordance with principles that they
would choose as rational and independent persons in an
original position of equality."61
Gilligan's objection to this theory is that "morality
is not grounded in universal, abstract principles but in the
daily experiences and moral problems of real people in their
everyday lives."62 In her disagreement Gilligan focused on

the question "how might what has to be done in this situa
tion best preserve and nurture the human relationships
involved?"63 Susan Okin offers support to Gilligan's per
spective.

Okin believes that Rawls' theory is flawed by

believing that those in the original position should assume
that people are mutually disinterested rather than mutually
engaged.64 Many believe that we have lost our ability to
make morally sound decisions about whose needs we will meet
and that care must be practiced congruently with justice in
order for our moral ideals to be put into action.

This

would still allow decisions to be made from an original
position of equality, but it would include the reality of
mutual engagement.

Tronto believes that in order to ad

dress the problems with care that she and others have iden
tified a concept of justice is required along with a demo
cratic and open opportunity for discussion, and more equal
access to power.
Palliative care has not received full support from the
standpoint of public policy because we have not yet dis
cussed what dying people deserve.

By reframing the issue,

using an ethic of care to discuss how the terminally ill and
their caregivers are mutually engaged with those who are
healthy, palliative care becomes not only a viable option,
but a desirable one.

Because of our tendency to be a death-

denying society, we have ignored the fact that people need a

special kind of care in their dying. That special kind of
care exists in hospice.
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CHAPTER 4
PALLIATIVE CARE, JUSTICE, AND THE ETHIC OF CARE
CONCLUSIONS

Hospice is a philosophy of care designed to provide
physical, emotional and spiritual support for people at the
end of life.

The goal is to allow the dying process to

unfold with a minimum of discomfort and themaintenance of
dignity and quality of life.
end of

Over 210,000 persons at the

life and their families receive care annually by the

nearly 2,000 hospice programs in the United States.1
Since the median age of hospice patients is 65 years,
the majority of hospice care is provided under the provi
sions of the hospice Medicare Benefit.

However, hospice

care comprises a very small percentage of the total dollars
spent on health care.

For example, payments made for the

hospice Medicare benefit were less than 1% of total benefit
payments in 1994.2 Although this group is small by compari
son to the entire population, their needs are great.

Hos

pice care is based on the premise that as a society, we have
an ethical responsibility to care for the dying and this re
sponsibility is grounded in the fundamental relatedness and
mutual obligation of human social membership.
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It is impera-
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tive for the continued moral development of our society that
we do not ignore the needs of the dying.
Providing health care benefits has traditionally been
based on a Rawlsian principle of distributive justice,
attempting to provide opportunities for equality of well
being.

A requirement of distributive justice is that people

get what they deserve.
is that they deserve.

The problem is determining what it
In a formal concept of justice, all

beings of a given category should be treated alike.

But,

who are the beings that belong in the same category and what
is the treatment that they should be given?

I suggest that

all who are dying of a terminal illness belong in the same
category and the treatment they should be given is pallia
tive care.

It is a just society's responsibility to make

this care available.
Robert Veatch discusses a "slice of time" perspective
on justice.

This means viewing the provision of just care

for the terminally ill from the perspective of those who are
currently in that position rather than from the vantage
point of all of society projecting that someday they may
have a terminal illness.

"...an independent theory of

justice will give planners at least prima facie reasons for
committing substantial resources to the terminally ill."3
In a discussion of the future of palliative care, Abyad
states his belief that conflicts between physicians, pa
tients, families and institutions will continue to increase
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in the face of limited resources.

He suggests several

models upon which to rely:
(1)

The autonomy model holds the patient's right to self-

determination as supreme.
(2)

The paternalism model allows the physician to guide

and/or limit the available choices.
(3)

The patient-provider collaboration aims for joint

decision making.
(4)

The beneficence model which requires the physician to

act in the patient's best interest.4
Choices two and four point to the past.

This is how

our system has been operating and is in direct conflict with
both an ethic of care and the philosophy of hospice care.
Choices one and three are more compatible.
In her later writings, Nel Noddings has explained that
her description of caring was meant to be "a phenomenologic
al analysis of how we are when we care and are cared for."5
She believes that we all must learn to care as a way of
being in the world.

The benefits of Noddings' perspective

of care as a way of being in the world is the potentially
profound impact this concept would make on relationships
between those who are dying and those who are caring for
them.
Health care professionals and an Ethic of Care

Edmund Pelligrino's four components of caring (care as
compassion, doing for others, caring for medical problems,

82

and taking care) provide the guidelines for the role of
physicians in providing palliative care.

"Instead of a

relationship of curing between physician and patient, a
relation of caring is needed to express the nature of the
obligation between physician and patient."6 The fact that
there is an obligation is supported by the principles of
justice.

The ultimate obligation is to achieve "patient

good" and Pelligrino uses caring to accomplish this.
Nurses comprise the largest portion of health care
providers in the United States and they have already articu
lated caring as an important value.7 At least one author
believes that the nursing actions of touching and truthtelling demonstrate a form of existential caring.

"To touch

the patient is to affirm the patient as a person rather than
an object and to communicate the value of caring as the
basis for nursing actions."9 Truth-telling assists the
patient in assessing subjective and objective realities in
illness and to make choices based on the unique meaning of
the illness experience.
Justice and Care

According to Michael Walzer, most philosophers' deepest
assumption is "that there is one, and only one, distributive
system that philosophy can rightly encompass."9 However,
both Gilligan and Tronto argue that there is equal necessity
for both justice and care orientations for a full and proper
morality.

Several other authors (Card 1990, Okin 1989,
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Tronto 1993) have suggested that a combination of justice
and care must take place in order to achieve an "adequate"
ethic.
A major concern in combining justice with care in the
support of palliative care is the tendency, when discussing
justice, to posit one greatest good that is not the primary
one for all people.

Tronto believes that care will be the

balancing force that will cause us to think about which
needs are met and how, about the distribution of care, and
about the its adequacy.

We must be cautious not to mandate

palliative care as the only alternative for everyone with a
terminal illness.

Instead, palliative care must be avail

able as an option for all.
Palliative Care as Public Policy

The recommendations for how to change existing policies
in order to create a climate for palliative care were out
lined in Chapter 2.

They were positioned within the

framework of the three primary goals of health care reform
(increased access, decreased costs, increased quality).
What was not addressed was Tronto's concept of care and
political theory.
care

She believes that only if we understand

as a political idea will we be able to change its

status and the status of those who do caring work in our
culture.

Tronto advocates expanding our moral boundaries to

include caring, in the ethical sense, into our political
vision.

She suggests that "the practice of care describes

the qualities necessary for democratic citizens to live
together well in a pluralistic society, and that only in a
just, pluralistic, democratic society can care flourish. 1,10
An ethic of care relies on a political commitment to value
caring and to reshape institutions to reflect this commit
ment.

I would suggest that this commitment would be valu

able in reshaping public policy on palliative care.
Using an ethic of care to support providing palliative
care affords our society a significant opportunity.

That

is, to profoundly impact the final relationship of one's
life (as we know it), that between the dying and those who
are caring for them.

In light of the fact that we have

become a society that shuns our dying, viewing them as
failures of our health care system, this opens the door for
a major shift in perspective.
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